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We provide a novel account of experimental evidence for the endowment effect using the salience
mechanism (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2011). The two-stage procedure implemented in experiments
implies that the endowed good and other goods are evaluated in different contexts.  We describe conditions
under which the standard effect occurs, but also account for recent evidence such as a reverse endowment
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Abstract
We provide a novel account of experimental evidence for the endowment eect
using the salience mechanism (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2011). The two-stage
procedure implemented in experiments implies that the endowed good and other goods
are evaluated in dierent contexts. We describe conditions under which this leads to
the standard eect, but also account for recent evidence such as a reverse endowment
eect for bads and a role for reference prices in modulating the WTA-WTP gap.
1 Introduction
Starting with Jack Knetsch (1989), experiments on the \endowment eect" (Richard Thaler
1980) typically rely on a two-stage procedure. In the rst stage, subjects are endowed with
a good, such as a mug. In the second stage, the same subjects are given the opportunity to
trade this good for another good of similar value, such as a pen. The endowment eect holds
that very few subjects chose to trade, sometimes as few as 10%. In related experiments,
subjects state selling prices for their endowment, which are much higher than their buying
prices for the same good. These patterns are hard to reconcile with standard choice theory,
which predicts that about half the subjects would trade and that selling prices and buying
prices are similar.
1Royal Holloway, University of London. CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Harvard University. We are
grateful to Dmitry Taubinsky for extremely helpful comments. Gennaioli thanks the Spanish Ministerio de
Ciencia y Tecnologia (ECO 2008-01666 and Ramon y Ca jal grants), the Barcelona GSE Research Network
and the Generalitat de Catalunya for nancial support. Shleifer thanks the Kauman Foundation for research
support.
1The common explanation of this evidence relies on Prospect Theory's loss aversion
(Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979). Because the pain of parting with the en-
dowment looms larger in the decision maker's mind than the pleasure of acquiring a good
of similar value (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991), a decision maker endowed with a
mug is unwilling to trade it for a pen (or states a high selling price).2
Recent experimental evidence, however, suggests that loss aversion relative to expecta-
tions may not be the whole story. Perhaps the most revealing fact is that the endowment
eect is sensitive to the type of goods involved and to the information available about them.
Nathan Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) argue that the endowment eect should not arise
in exchanges of identical goods. Lyle Brenner, Yuval Rottenstreich, Sanjay Sood and Baler
Bilgin (2007) show that the pattern reverses in experiments concerning bads rather than
goods, as decision makers become systematically eager to trade away their bad endowment.
In experiments investigating the gap between selling and buying prices, the gap is sensi-
tive to information about the market price of the endowment (Raymond Weaver and Shane
Frederick 2011).
A common thread of these works is that contextual factors such as the nature of the
goods involved or the information provided about market prices systematically aect the
manifestation of the endowment eect in ways dicult to reconcile with standard accounts
based on reference points and loss aversion. In this paper, we try to account for these
ndings by modeling the endowment eect as a form of context dependence, arising through
the salience mechanism described in Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (BGS 2011 a,b). As
reviewed next, when a decision maker contemplates the options available to him, he focuses
on { and gives disproportionate weight to { those features along which each option \stands
out", or is salient, relative to the other options. In this way, a good's salient features, and thus
its evaluation, depend on what it is compared to. The gist of our salience-based explanation
of the endowment eect is that the two-stage procedure implemented in experiments (but
perhaps also the experience of ownership in the real world) implies that the endowed good
and the other goods are evaluated in dierent contexts.
2By modeling the reference point as expectations, Botond Koszegi and Matthew Rabin (2006) reconciled
the endowment eect with the fact that people trade in large amounts if they expect to do so. See also John
List (2003), Keith Ericson and Andreas Fuster (2011) and Ori Heetz and List (2011).
2Specically, after the decision maker is given the endowment good e, he values it in
comparison with his status-quo of having nothing. In this context, what stands out are
good e's best attributes. The decision maker overweights these attributes, which leads to an
overvaluation of good e. This captures a perceptual \warm glow" induced by receiving a gift
or getting ownership of an object (Tversky and Dale Grin, 1991), driven by the decision
maker's focus on that object's upside. In the second (trade) stage, the decision maker is
given the option to trade the endowment e for a new good n. Now the evaluation of n is
shaped not only by the backdrop of having nothing but also by the contrast between n and
e. When this contrast makes salient the new good's disadvantage relative to the endowment,
the decision maker undervalues the new good and displays the endowment eect.
The critical asymmetry between the endowment and the new good comes from the warm
glow of ownership: when the decision maker receives a mug, he focuses on its most valuable
uses. These uses are still present in his mind when he considers exchanging the mug for
a pen, so that the mug's valuation persists in the second stage. This logic yields the new
predictions that the endowment eect should be reversed in the case of bads, should not
arise when identical goods are exchanged, and that its manifestation should be sensitive to
information about market prices.
2 Salience
Following BGS (2011b), we consider the simplest case of two-attribute goods, where a generic
good k is a two dimensional vector of qualities (q1k;q2k) 2 R2, and the decision maker's
intrinsic utility is linear in the attributes, v(q1k;q2k) = w1q1k + w2q2k, where the weights
wi sum up to 1. The perceived value of the good, however, diers from its intrinsic value
because the decision maker overweights the good's salient attribute at the expense of its
non-salient attribute: if attribute i is salient and attribute j is not, then the decision maker
















3where  2 (0;1] captures the degree to which the decision maker neglects non salient features.
Referring to such neglect, we call our decision maker a \local thinker" (when  = 1 the local
thinker is a standard rational decision maker).
Which attribute is salient for good k depends on two factors: the decision maker's consid-
eration set C and a salience function  : R2 ! R+. The set C includes the goods considered
by the decision maker when evaluating good k, and provides our measure of context. The
salience of attribute i = 1;2 for good k is a function (qi;k;qi) that measures the extent to
which the good's attribute i \stands out" relative to its average value qi in C. This intuition
is in line with well established features of human perception: our visual apparatus auto-
matically allocates scarce attentional resources to aspects of the environment that are most
surprising or dierent from what is expected. To capture these features of perception, we
assume that the salience function satises three properties: i) ordering: whenever an interval
[x;y] is contained in a larger interval [x0;y0], we have (x;y) < (x0;y0); ii) diminishing sensi-
tivity (Weber's law): for all x;y > 0 and any  > 0, we have (x+;y+) < (x;y); and iii)
reection: if x;y;x0;y0 > 0 then (x;y) < (x0;y0) if and only if ( x; y) < ( x0; y0).
Following BGS (2011 b), we use a salience function symmetric and homogenous of degree
zero ((x;y) = (x;y) = (y;x) for all  > 0, with (0;0) = 0), which is sucient
to ensure diminishing sensitivity. A typical example is (x;y) = jx   yj=(jxj + jyj). Due
to ordering, salience (qik;qi) increases with the distance jqik   qij. Due to diminishing
sensitivity and reection (qik;qi) decreases as qik and qi rise in absolute value.
3 Of Mugs and Pens
To formalize trade of mugs for pens, suppose that q1 captures a good's \quality for drinking"
while q2 is its \quality for writing" (both measured in utils), and that the decision maker
puts equal weight on both attributes, w1 = w2 = 1=2. A mug M is a good (qM;0), a pen P
is a good (0;qP), where the zeroes capture the fact that experiments involve no writing mugs
or drinking pens.3 Suppose further that M and P have the same quality level qM = qP = q.
Then, absent salience distortions, the decision maker values both objects at q=2.
3The main results go through for complex goods having non-zero attribute values.
4As the decision maker is given the mug in the endowment stage, he evaluates M against
the status quo (0;0) of not having it. The consideration set is Ce = f(q;0);(0;0)g and the
average good is (q=2;0). By ordering, the quality of the mug is salient: (q;q=2) > (0;0) =
0. The local thinker weighs by 1=(1 + ) the mug's quality for drinking and by =(1 + ) its
(zero) quality for writing, so that the weights add up to one. The mug's perceived value is:
v
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The mug is overvalued because its quality is salient against the backdrop of not having it.
Since in the endowment stage the local thinker's focus is on the mug's quality, this focus
should also play a role when he subsequently considers whether to trade the mug. To capture
this idea in a simple way, we assume that the mug's salience ranking in the endowment stage
carries through to the trading stage with probability : when  > 0 there is a warm glow of
ownership in the trading stage.
In the trading stage, the decision maker must decide whether to trade his mug for a
pen. The consideration set thus becomes Ct = f(q;0);(0;0);(0;q)g, and the average good is
(q=3;q=3).4 As a result, the pen's quality for writing is not salient because:
(0;q=3) > (q;q=3) , (0;1=3) > (1;1=3),
which follows from homogeneity of degree zero. Due to diminishing sensitivity, the pen's
complete lack of quality for drinking is more salient than its higher-than-average quality for
writing, implying that at the trading stage the value of the pen is
v
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Because the mug and the pen are perfectly symmetric goods, in the trading stage Ct
they both have a salient downside. However, accounting for the warm glow of ownership,
4Removing decision maker's status quo (0;0) from Ct does not substantially aect our analysis.




e) = q 
(1   ) + 
1 + 
. (3)
The mug may also be undervalued relative to the rational case. However, as long as  > 0
it is valued more than the pen. As a consequence, the local thinker keeps it, exhibiting the
endowment eect.5 If  = 0, the endowment eect disappears.
This mechanism can provide a context-based foundation for loss aversion based on the
idea that the valuation of the goods we own is at least partly formed against the backdrop
of not having them, while trades are valued by comparing exchange options.6 The rst
comparison induces us to focus on the best attributes of the goods we own, while the second
comparison induces us to focus on either good's relative disadvantages. The combination of
the two stages boosts the relative valuation of the goods we own. This perspective on the
endowment eect makes several testable predictions:
i) If the good available for trade is an identical mug, (q;0), then Ct = f(q;0);(0;0);(q;0)g,
and the average good is (2q=3;0). Because (q;2q=3) > (0;0), the upside is salient both
for the new mug and for the original one, so both are valued at (1). There is no endowment
eect for identical objects. Similarly, if the new good is a better mug, (2q;0), the decision
maker likewise focuses on its upside and overvalues it. There is no endowment eect in
upgrading. The endowment eect requires a trade-o between the endowed good and the
new good.
ii) If the endowment is a bad ( q;0), then in the endowment stage the decision maker
focuses on the bad's downside because ( q; q=2) > (0;0). Given the option to trade
the endowment with a dierent bad (0; q), he focuses on the upside 0 of the latter: by
diminishing sensitivity and reection (0; q=3) > ( q; q=3). In the case of bads there
is then a \cold glow"of ownership and people are overly willing to trade their lot. There is
a reverse endowment eect for bads.
5Expression (3) can also be interpreted as the evaluation of a subject who averages between the salience
rankings of the two stages.
6If the pen is suciently better than the mug, e.g. qP > qM 

1 +  1 


, the local thinker will trade the
pen for the mug (even though the pen's downside is still salient). The coecient in square brackets can be
viewed as the loss aversion parameter.
6iii) If the endowment is a pen and a mug, the warm glow of ownership would apply to all
goods. As a result, keeping the assumption of linear utility, the decision maker is no longer
reluctant to exchange a mug for a pen (or vice versa) in the trading stage. Thus, there is no
endowment eect for comprehensive endowments.
4 Of Mugs and Bucks
We now turn to the experimental evidence of a gap between decision makers' willingness to
pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). Consider again the case of a mug of quality
q. Here q1 is the quality q of the mug while q2 =  p is its price disutility. The utility from
the mug (q; p) is q=2   p=2.
In the endowment stage the consideration set is Ce = f(q;0);(0;0)g and the mug's upside
is salient. In the trading stage the decision maker includes in the consideration set the
option (0;WTA) of obtaining his WTA, so CWTA = f(q;0);(0;0);(0;WTA)g. As before, by
diminishing sensitivity the downside of all options in CWTA is salient. The decision maker's
utility from (0;WTA) is:
v
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The monetary gain is undervalued because the decision maker focuses on the loss of the mug.
The value of the mug is equal to (3) as before. The decision maker's WTA equates (4) and
(3) and is thus equal to:
WTA = q 






Consider now the decision maker's WTP for the mug. Because he is not endowed with
the mug, he has no warm glow of ownership. He then determines his WTP in CWTP =
f(q; WTP);(0;0)g. Now the price and the quality of the mug are equally salient, so the
decision maker states his correct valuation:
WTP = q. (6)
7Compare (5) to (6): in line with the endowment eect, there is a positive WTA-WTP gap,
equal to q  (1 )=. This gap is shaped by the warm glow of ownership , as well as by
the extent of local thinking .
Additional evidence for this mechanism is provided by by Kahneman et al (1991). Con-
sider a decision maker who is not endowed with a mug, but is asked for his mug cash-
equivalent at the trading stage. He faces a problem identical to that of the endowed subject,
namely, nding the price at which he is indierent between receiving that price or the mug.
Yet, due to the absence of warm glow ( = 0), we predict that this subject's WTA is given
by (6) and not by (5). This is consistent with Kahneman et al's (1991) ndings.
Weaver and Frederick (2011) show that the WTA-WTP gap changes when subjects are
provided with information about the mug's market price. The dependence of WTA and
WTP on market prices is not in itself surprising. With a high market price pM > q, a
rational decision maker expecting to sell the mug in the market with probability  (and to
keep it with probability 1 ) values the mug at pM+(1 )q. The value of the mug clearly
increases in pM, but of course there is no endowment eect.7 What needs to be explained is
the persistence of the WTA-WTP gap, and its amplication with high market prices.
From the local thinker's perspective, information about market prices simply brings to
his attention an alternative valuation of the mug besides consumption, namely the possibility
of trading at the market price. Relative to the case of no reference prices, the local thinker's
consideration set in the trading stage now includes the option (0;pM) of selling the mug in
the market, Ct = f(q;0);(0;0);(0;WTA);(0;pM)g. To determine WTA, note that also in
this context the downside of each option is salient. Moreover, the mug's quality is boosted
by 1= due to the warm glow of endowment, as in (5) (where for simplicity we set  = 1).
The decision maker's selling price is thus




When stating his WTP for a mug, however, the local thinker's consideration set is CWTP =
f(q; WTP);(0;0);(0;pM  WTP)g, which also takes into account the possibility of trading
7The probability  of trade is taken to be rational and exogenous, and may depend on the cost/ease of
nding trading partners.
8the mug at market price, namely (0;pM   WTP). Then, provided the market price is
suciently high relative to q,8 the downside of each option is salient. In particular, the price
WTP paid when buying the mug is very salient to the buyer. Thus, given an expectation 
of re-selling the mug, the local thinker's buying price is





Equations (7) and (8) capture the WTA-WTP gap in the presence of reference prices. Two
points can be noted. First, the gap arises whenever the local thinker is not certain about
trading: for any  < 1 (and  < 1) we have WTA > WTP.9 When  = 1 the gap disappears
as WTA = WTP = pM, just as in the rational case. Second, consistent with Weaver and
Frederick, the selling price is more sensitive than the buying price to pM when pM is high.
In this regime the WTA-WTP gap increases with the good's market (or reference) price. A
similar calculation shows that when pM is low relative to q, the selling price is less sensitive
than the buying price to pM. In this case, as pM becomes smaller the WTA-WTP gap
increases, resulting in a U-shaped relation between WTA-WTP gap and pM.10
5 Conclusion
Unlike Prospect Theory, our model does not feature loss aversion, either in the utility or in
the salience functions, which can both be symmetric in gains and losses [e.g. the salience
function may satisfy ( q;0) = (q;0)]. We have shut down any mechanism involving
loss aversion relative to expectations. The mechanism we propose is based on the novel
ingredients of salience and context dependence.
Our approach highlights a fundamental dierence between the context of absolute eval-
uation, in the endowment stage, and the context of comparative evaluation, in the trading
8Formally, this is true when pM > 2  WTP, where WTP is given by (8). This follows from pM > q if
trade is unlikely and  is small.
9This is the case even if  = 0. The asymmetry between buying and selling arises at the trade stage:
since downsides are salient, the buying price is relatively more salient for the buyer.
10This feature is also predicted by Weaver and Frederick, who provide suggestive evidence for it. To see
how it arises in our model, note that when pM < q, the owner of the mug never sells it in the market, and
sets WTA = q=(1 + ). The subject without a mug can try to buy it in the market. His consideration set is
then Ct = f(q; WTP);(0;0);(q; pM)g and so his buying price WTP decreases as pM goes to zero.
9stage. In the former, the decision maker focuses on the endowment's most extreme attribute
(due to the ordering property of salience), whereas in the latter his attention is drawn to the
alternative's downside (due to diminishing sensitivity), generating an endowment eect. In
our view, what makes ownership special is the focus on the most attractive attributes of the
goods one owns; there is no warm glow of ownership when these attributes are surpassed.
This intuition highlights a deep connection between the endowment eect and attitudes
towards risk. In BGS (2011a) we showed how the same mechanism of salience can shed light
on risk attitudes, whereby the decision maker is risk averse if he focuses on a risky lottery's
downside, and risk seeking if he focuses on its upside. Similarly, here the endowment eect is
due to an aversion to the alternative good generated by focusing on its downside.11 Moreover,
just as BGS (2011a) show that salience generates a shift from risk seeking to risk aversion as
lottery gains are reected into losses, here we predict a reverse endowment eect for bads.
Salience therefore provides a unied account of disparate puzzles such as the endowment
eect, preference reversals, and the public health dilemma as the consequence of the same
perceptual forces of diminishing sensitivity and ordering applied to dierent contexts of
absolute and comparative evaluation.
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